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April 5, 2011 1 Introduction
Language is certainly the most important means of communication in all human societies. At the same
time, language is one of the most important aspects of an individual's personality, as well as of its social
and cultural identity. These two aspects of language often nd themselves in conict with one another.
On the one hand, network externality properties of the communication aspect imply that the greater is
the number of speakers of a certain language, the more useful is that language in communication and in
the limit it would be ecient to have only one single language for communication purposes.
Balancing this tendency is the desire of many individuals to preserve their language as a marker of
identity. In a static perspective, language, like talents and other personal characteristics, can be seen as
part of the denition, or initial endowment, of an individual. In a dynamic setting, however, the situation
is slightly more complex. We can here distinguish between dynamics within a generation and between
generations.
An individual can over its lifespan change its language, or acquire additional idioms. This is part
of the "normal" planning of the individual. However, the more important aspect is the change between
generations. Each new-born individual is endowed with its own characteristics, dening this individual.
This endowment is often, at least partially, determined by the individuals of the previous generation. If
the generations were not to overlap and if the preferences and other endowments were not transferred to
the next generations by the parent generations, the intertemporal aspect would be without consequence
for a welfare analysis. The input into the analysis, preferences and other endowments at any given time,
would be independent of previous situations, and we would have a sequence of static analyses.
This is dierent, however, if endowments and preferences are passed on, however incompletely. Then,
the individuals of the present generation inuence the environment of the coming generations, and in
a welfare analysis this would have to be accounted for. The analysis is further complicated by the fact
that generations overlap. The transmitted preferences to the new cohorts have a direct eect on the
distribution of preferences during the life-time of individuals of the parent generation and, hence, on the
inputs into the welfare analysis during their life-time.
Looking at language, we note that the drastic changes in language use occur between generations,
where a language shift typically happens over three consecutive generations: the members of one gener-
ation are unilingual in one language, their children grow up bilingual and their grandchildren unilingual
in the second language.
The survival of a language, its implantation in the next generation, depends on many factors, one of
which is its status in society. This status is inuenced by, among other things, the possibilities to use
the language in various social areas, domains. Status planning is concerned with the issue of dening
the ocial status of a languages. This has to be operationalized, however, and one way of achieving this
is giving legal rights to speakers of a certain language to use it in dierent domains. Such domains {
subject to status planning { typically include various public oces, public education at dierent levels,
public information such as street names or texts of laws and regulations.
Whether a language receives an ocial status in any specic domain or not, is very often a political
issue, and it is an instrument that can be used by those in power { be it a dominant majority or a
political elite { to control and exploit those who are weak, whether they are underprivileged masses or
ethnic minorities or both. An analysis of these aspects is closely related to rent-seeking and political,
social and economic power. These are questions analyzed in, among other disciplines, positive economics
and will not be further treated in this essay.
One can also, however, look at the problem from a normative perspective. One may look for acceptable
allocations of rights according to some ethics criterion. The choice of rights for minorities can, for instance,
be based on the equivalence principle, where (potential) Pareto improvements on some initial situation
are to be realized within the community, or the desired allocation of rights may be governed by some
other normative principles, such as the maximization of a (paternalistic) welfare function. The rst
approach is basically a cost-benet analysis. One crucial assumption here is the denition of the point of
2reference, the status quo. Dierent choices lead to dierent conclusions. We discuss this in some detail
in Wickstr om (2007).
Since, as noted above, the preferences of future generations are partially determined by the actions
and institutions of the currently living cohorts, the cost-benet analysis will have to deal with endogenous
preferences and path dependencies. This is discussed in Wickstr om (2010b). In that contribution, the
long-run welfare-optimal allocations were also touched upon. The present paper analyzes this aspect in
more detail.
The welfare function is seen as a representation of the preferences of a social planner. This is the
exogenous point of departure of the welfare analysis. By representing the preferences of the social planner
by a welfare function, we give the problem a consistent frame, within which the analysis can be carried out.
Individual (indirect) utility functions are seen as functions of the (implicit) incomes of the individuals. A
(Paretian) welfare function is in turn an increasing function in these individual utilities. The preferences
of the social planner for redistribution are represented by the marginal welfare changes due to small
income change for the various individuals. In comparing these marginal welfare values, the planner can
nd welfare-improving redistributions of income.1
In this essay, we discuss, how the desire to redistribute in favor of the disadvantaged alter the simple
cost-benet analysis. Thereby also the dynamic eect is considered. However, we do not undertake a
dynamic analysis, but consider only the long-run steady states of welfare which we compare for dierent
allocations of language rights. In comparison to a traditional welfare-optimizing analysis there are, hence,
some added ingredients that alter the analysis in dierent ways. First, we deal with discrete changes,
which implies that there are discrete jumps in implicit incomes and hence in the marginal evaluations of
the social value of income redistributions; we call this the "income" eect. Second, preferences are to a
certain extent endogenous. Third, there are long-run endogenous dynamic eects altering the composition
as well as the individual preferences of the population. We demonstrate, how the welfare changes can be
decomposed into the implications of these dierent eects. We also decompose the welfare changes into
eciency and distribution eects.
1.1 Language and the allocation of rights
One can distinguish between various characteristics of the goods enjoyed by the individuals in a society.
The actual use of a language is an individual matter, giving benets to the individual using it.2 Whether
a person chooses to use a certain language or not in a given situation, will to a large extent depend upon
the constraints it is facing. One important constraint is, of course, whether one is understood or not and
manages to communicate. This can partially be determined by legal rights, forcing, for instance, public
oces to accept the use of certain languages in doing ocial business. Ignoring associated costs, such
rights to communication in a certain language can in principle be made available to all individuals to the
same extent. Unlike many other rights, like the right to smoke in public places versus the right to enjoy
fresh air at the same location, the right to use a certain language in a given setting is a non-exclusive
1Note that we are not attributing any \deeper" signicance to the welfare function in the sense of social-choice theory.
It is here only a representation of the preferences for income (re)distributions of a social planner. The only axioms implied
are that it should respect Pareto eciency and anonymity (see below). The second axiom simply says that an individual is
only characterized by its implicit income, and two individuals with the same implicit income are treated identically.
2Of course, one person's use of a language might very well aect the well-being of the person it is talking to, or might
want to communicate with, producing an externality, be it positive or negative. The larger is the number of speakers of
a language, the greater is the potential number of contacts and, hence, the benet of the language to a person knowing
it. This network externality is central in the analysis of the long-term dynamics and equilibria of language usage as a
means of communication. This is analyzed by, among others, Selten and Pool (1991), Church and King (1993), as well
as G uth, Strobel, and Wickstr om (1997), who look at the benets of learning other languages in addition to the mother
tongue, and in, for instance, Wickstr om (2005), Fernando, Valij arvi, and Goldstein (2010), Patriarca and Lepp anen (2004),
or Minett and Wang (2008), where the possibilities of the survival of communities of native speakers are analyzed. The
present analysis treats this externality property of language usage as part of the set of exogenous constraints facing the
individual and is, hence, a possible factor inuencing its propensity to pay for a certain language right.
3right that does not per se exclude the right to use another language in the same setting: My right to
communicate with (and get answers from) a public oce in Bislama, say, does not infringe on your right
to use Volap uk in doing your business with the same oce.
Considering the costs of implementing a right, we note that in the dependency on the number of
beneciaries all possible degrees of economies of scale can occur. Having street signs in a certain language,
does not depend on the number of speakers of the idiom, involving only xed costs in this respect, whereas
the provision of elementary education is more or less proportional to the number of beneciaries.
Here we are focusing on these legal rights and not on the many other possibilities to use a language
outside of the public sector. The latter possibilities are determined primarily by the number of speakers,
but also by other factors, such as the domain in which a certain interaction takes place. In a comprehensive
analysis of language rights and justice also these aspects would have to be taken into account.3 In this
essay, however, we limit the analysis to formal legal rights.
1.2 Status
Preferences are endogenous in two manners. By giving their mother tongue to the o-springs, the parent
generation inuences the preferences for dierent language regimes in society. We model this as a function
of the status the language enjoys, when the parents make their decision. The higher the status of the
language, the higher the probability that a member of the following generation will adopt it and have
preferences for its use in society. The second way preferences are endogenous is also given by the status
of the idiom. A given individual's preferences for giving rights to the language is modeled to depend on
the social status of the language. That is, the propensities to pay for language rights are determined by
the status the language enjoys among its speakers, both through a direct eect on the individuals alive
at a certain time, and through an indirect, dynamic, eect determining the number of speakers in the
next generation.
By relating the status of a language to the formal rights granted to the usage of the language, we
introduce a feed-back mechanism into the system.4
2 The basic model
The basic structure and notation closely follow that of Wickstr om (2010b).
2.1 Individuals
Society at time t is made up of a set N0
t of all individuals born into society at time t as well as the
set N0
t 1 of all individuals born at time t   1. That is, an individual lives two periods and the set of
individuals alive in period t is given by Nt := N0
t [ N0
t 1. At birth an individual is socialized into a
certain language l, where the set of all languages under consideration is denoted by L.5 The number of
individuals of cohort t in language group l, that is the number of individuals born in period t into group
l, is written as nl0
t . Since individuals live for two periods, the number of older individuals alive at time t
is nl0




3For more general analyses in this direction, the reader is referred to, for instance, Kymlicka and Patten (2003) and the
references therein. For a more formal analysis, see also Parijs (2002), as well as the contribution of the same author in
Kymlicka and Patten (2003). A basic discussion can also be found in Wickstr om (2010a).
4The structure could easily be adopted to deal with questions related to various forms of education. The members of
the parent generation decides on the education given to the members of the next generation, which in turn inuence their
preferences for educating their children etc. This process could lead to very dierent societies in the long run equilibria.
5For the purpose of this essay, we ignore the fact that individuals can belong to several language groups at the same
time. The assumption that each individual is associated with one language simplies the notational problems considerably
and does not detract from the principal points of the analysis.
42.2 Language rights
Let the set of legally dened domains be D. The set of rights in eect at time t is a matrix rt of zeroes
and ones. The right to use language l in domain d in period t is then written as rld
t = 1 and the denial of
that right as rld
t = 0. The propensity of individual i to pay for a certain allocation of rights, r, is written
as bi (r).
This propensity to pay is, of course, only well-dened in relation to a status quo. That is, we normalize
the propensities to pay to be equal to zero at the status quo. Two possible polar choices are  r = O, all
rld are zero, and  r = I, all rld are equal to one. The rst case means that our benchmark is that there
are no rights at all in eect and the second signies that the benchmark is the existence of all possible
rights in all domains for all languages.
Intuitively, one can say that, in the rst case, we are born without any individual rights, and all rights
have to be bought from society. In the second case, we are all born with all possible rights, and the
negation of any right has to be bought from the beneciaries of that right by the rest of society.6 For the
purpose of this essay, we will assume the former, that is bi (O) is set equal to 0 for all i. The right to be
able to use a certain language in a certain situation can for our purposes be looked upon as a non-rival
good. The \demand" or propensity to pay for this good will vary over the individuals. The sum of all
individuals' propensities to pay will then give society's total propensity to pay for this specic right. A
dierence from the text-book case is that the rights are not continuous, but discrete non-rival goods. Of
course, the individual propensity to pay will depend (directly or indirectly) on a number of exogenous
factors such as income and prices, but also the availability of other language rights will enter the demand
for any specic right to use a certain language.7
2.3 Costs
Let c(r;n) be the costs to society that the realization of the rights allocation r causes compared to the
status quo. The function c is assumed to be concave in nl if rld = 1 for some d.8
2.4 Dynamic structure
Here, we can distinguish two types of dynamic eects. There is one eect due to the intergenerational
structure determining the composition of the society in terms of language groups. There is another eect
due to the possible change in preferences of individual users of a language as a result of status changes.
This eect simply says that the propensity to pay for rights for the language might be dierent after a
right has been introduced than before the introduction, if the implementation of the right increases the
status of the language, making the speakers evaluate this and further rights more positively.
The second eect has to do with the transmission of the language to following generations. It is
also here reasonable to assume that the rights conveyed on speakers of language l in eect at period t
inuence the status of that language in that period and, hence, their choice of language for the next
generation, that is the size of nl0
t+1.9 That is, we assume, that parents in bringing up their children,
6For a further discussion of the choice of status quo the reader is referred to Wickstr om (2007), for instance.
7The latter point can be partially operationalized as the \linguistic distance" between the languages. See, for instance,
the analysis in Ginsburgh, Ortu~ no-Ort n, and Weber (2005) or Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh, and Weber (2005). These authors use
such a distance as a measure of disenfranchisement. However, the propensity to pay will in general depend on other factors,
as well. Especially the emotional attachment to the language seems to be important. Consider, for instance, the situation
in Wales, where virtually every Welch-speaker is bilingual in English, too { see, for instance, the statistics cited in Grin
(1992) { or in the Basque country, where almost all speakers of Basque are bilingual in French or Spanish. Nevertheless,
the propensity to pay for an ocial status of the respective language seems to be considerable among its speakers.
8For a further discussion of the assumptions on this function, see Wickstr om (2007).
9The long-run eects of certain allocation of language rights would be part of the \emotional" aspect in determining the
propensities to pay. The designation of certain languages as \ocial" in given domains gives them a higher status, which
reduces the incentives of following generations to use the non-ocial ones, reducing the number of their speakers. This can
5decide on socializing them into their own language or another (majority) language depending, on the
one hand, on the status of the own language compared to the alternative language(s) { the emotional,
cultural aspect { as well as, on the other hand, on the number of speakers { the practical, communication
aspect. Hence, the distribution of the individuals on the dierent language groups, as well as the rights
given to the speakers of the various languages will determine the size of the groups in the next cohort.
























t :=  rmd
t   rmd
t = 0 for m 6= l
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t is the vector of all nl0











By setting _ nl0
t+1 = 0 for all l, we nd a (in general) dierent steady-state distribution of the language
groups for any given allocation of rights in society:




rmd :=  rmd   rmd = 0 if m 6= l
rld
t  0 for all d
rld = 1 for some d
. (2.4)
The implications of this dynamic structure in general are analyzed in some detail in Wickstr om
(2010b). In this essay, we will look at the welfare consequences of the dierent steady states.
2.5 Eciency
In analyzing the ecient allocation of rights, one can rst look for Pareto eciency. This is done in
Wickstr om (2010b) applying the compensated-variation criterion.
Letting N be the relevant set of individuals and suppressing the time index, we nd the aggregated





This has to be compared to the costs to society of providing these rights. The change in language
rights from the status quo to r is an improvement according to the compensated-variation criterion if
X
i2N
bi (r) > c(r). (2.6)
also lead to a situation of diglossia where the domains of the ocial language are constantly extended at the expense of
non-ocial languages. This, in turn, would give the speakers of the ocial language a head start in life. In the long run, it
might even lead to the death of non-ocial languages. For a further discussion of this possibility, see Wickstr om (2005).
6By introducing compensation payments (or taxes), i, we can reformulate this slightly dierently.
The sum of the compensation payments covers the costs of introducing the rights { the introduction is












The net benet to individual i of the allocation of rights r in comparison to the status quo is given by
ai  
r;i
:= bi (r)   i. (2.8)
The necessary requirement that this allocation be a feasible (strong) Pareto improvement, is then that
all a's be positive, that is, that  be in the set dened by
P (r) :=








A feasible (strong) Pareto improvement then requires that
 2 F (r) \ P (r). (2.10)
If we ignore distributional aspects, we can dene potential Pareto improvements by the set
E (r) :=
(












The compensated-variation criterion 2.6 is then equivalent to
 2 F (r) \ E (r). (2.12)
The Pareto-ecient allocations can then be found by maximizing the sum of the net benets, denoted
by S, over all possible allocations of rights subject to the feasibility constraint 2.7:
max





and  2 F (r) (2.13)






bi (r)   c(r)
#
. (2.14)
Clearly, the resulting  2 E (r), but if taxes are exible, we can also nd a  2 P (r)  E (r),
satisfying the solution to 2.13. This is the rst-best Pareto-ecient solution to the problem of allocating
language rights.
This can be modied in two ways. Firstly, not all tax structures are possible; specically, the taxes in
P (r) are not institutionally feasible. This necessitates a second-best analysis of the optimal language
rights. Secondly, the social planner has preferences over distributions of incomes, postulating trade-os
between eciency and more egalitarian distributions. That is, the goal function, the welfare function, is
more general than the (sum of) net individual benets, and problem 2.13 becomes a special case of the
welfare analysis. Indeed, even if the taxes in P (r) were institutionally feasible, they are not necessarily
optimal.
3 Eciency versus equality: welfare optimization
In order to address the issue of justice, as already noted, we need some standard of comparison between
individuals. We will deal with the individual changes ai from the given status quo and then discuss the
criteria for the interpersonal comparison of these changes.
73.1 Welfare function
We dene the (indirect) utility of an individual as a function of its income stream ai. In our case, it is
given by some exogenous income !i plus the net benet of the language rights ai:
Ui = ui  
!i + ai
(3.1)





We assume that the welfare function is Paretian, that is:
@w
@Ui > 0;8i (3.3)











The parameter i is a function of !i and ai and is the evaluation of the planner of a unit increase in
income ai when it changes from !i to !i + ai.10 If the planner is interested in redistribution in favor
of the poor, i is decreasing in both arguments. If the planner is only interested in eciency, all i are
constant and equal. If the planner treats all individuals anonymously and neutrally, that is, only the
implicit income matters, all functions i () are identical and can be written as  (). In this essay, this is
the case.
In looking at the long-run changes in W, we compare steady states and make a comparative-static
analysis of two steady states. A truly dynamic analysis, on the other hand, would have to analyze a
stream of values and compare the values at dierent times under some assumptions on discounting.11
3.2 Tax structure
Contrary to the analysis in section 2.5 it is now assumed that not all transfer payments are possible, but
are restricted to some (institutionally given) set 	 that denes the institutionally feasible taxes. That is,
restriction 2.7 is replaced by
 2 	 \ F (r). (3.5)
It is assumed that the vector of zeroes { no transfer payments { is in the set 	. Then, clearly, 0 2 	\F (r)
and, by denition, the status quo  r is institutionally feasible, ai ( r;0) = 0.
The assumption of an institutionally restricted tax structure is crucial and necessitates a second-best
analysis of the problem.
3.3 Simplifying assumptions
In order to make the analysis tractable, we limit ourselves to two languages, A and B, and two language
groups NA and NB of size nA and nB. Further, the propensities to pay are positive only for the proper
language; that is, the propensity to pay biL > 0 if i 2 NL and biL = 0 if i = 2 NL. We only consider one
domain, and the taxes paid by individual i for nancing a right of language L in that domain is denoted
by iL. We then compare the situation with the introduction of a right in this domain for both languages
rA = rB = 1 with a situation where the right is only introduced for language A, rA = 1, rB = 0. The







10Of course, in a continuous setting the dependency on a disappears and  is just the marginal evaluation of an income
increase given a certain income. Because of the discrete nature of the problem analyzed, we will have an "income" eect
on the 's, since they in general are dierent before and after the change.
11In Wickstr om (2007) this is briey discussed.
83.4 Welfare eects






















!i;biA + biB + biB   iA   iA   iB   iB
. The change in taxes of individual i
without the dynamic eects is given by iB and the dynamic eects discussed in section 2.4 are given by
NA and NB, the changes in the steady-state sizes of the two communities due to the higher status
of language B caused by the implementation of the right, and the corresponding changes biB, the
increased propensity to pay for giving the right to language B due to its increased status caused by the
implementation of the right, and iL, the change in the taxes due to the change in the steady-state sizes
of the two communities after the implementation of the right for language B. Again, be it noted that
we do not claim to carry out a true dynamic analysis, but simply limit ourselves to a comparative-static
analysis of dierent steady states.



















. Under the assumption that  is non-increasing in its arguments, that is,
the redistributive preferences of the planner go in favor of poorer individuals, and that individuals only
care about the status of their own language, we nd that for i 2 NA, i := i
1   i
0 wil have the sign
of iB + iA + iB. For i 2 NB, it will have the opposite sign of biB   iB + biB   iA   iB.

























It is welfare improving to introduce the right for language B if W is positive. This is our decision
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L : = AL + BL = c
 
nL
 LM : =
LM
nL
That is,  L
1 is the planer's average evaluation of the marginal change in welfare of an income increase
in group L. It is assumed that if there is a change in the size of the group the new individuals are
representative in the sense that their distribution of income mirrors that of the original members. The
average propensity to pay for the right in group L is  bL and the total propensity to pay is bL etc. The
change in the total propensity to pay and in the tax due to the dynamic eects are given by:
bL :=  bLnL +  bLnL +  bLnL (3.11)
LM :=  LMnL +  LMnL +  LMnL
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Again, we are here assuming that the dynamic eects do not inuence the distributional characteristics
of taxes and propensities to pay within the communities.
4 Implications for welfare optimization
Expression 3.9 consists of several eects. As our benchmark we take the simple ex ante cost-benet
analysis, comparing bB and B. We then look at the modications that become necessary by the extension
to the case with endogenous preferences (the status eect), by distribution considerations and due to the
intergenerational dynamic eect as well as because of the discrete nature of the problem. We discuss the
various eects separately. First we ignore distributional considerations and look at the pure eciency
aspect.
4.1 Eciency
If the planner is only interested in eciency, all the 's are identical and only the net-benet eects
matter. Expression 3.9 becomes identical to expression 2.6 with the dynamic eects added:
W
 
= bB   B
+ bA   AA   AB (4.1)
+ bB   BA   BB
4.1.1 Static case







Here the change in bB is only due to a possible increase in  bB because of the added status language B
is enjoying after the right has been realized. If bB is indeed positive, that is, the aggregate propensity
to pay for the right is status dependent (the preferences are endogenous), the second term is positive.
11This provides a clear argument for more extensive language rights than what is implied by the ex ante
cost-benet benchmark.
4.1.2 Dynamic case
In the dynamic case, 4.1 can be written as:
W
 
= bB   B (4.2)
+ bA   A + bB   B
Now a change in the size of the two communities has to be taken into consideration. The rst line is the
ex ante net benet of the introduction of the right for language B and the second line gives the dynamic
eect due to an increase in nB and possibly in  bB and a corresponding decrease in nA. Associated with
this there will be a change in the taxes with an increase in B, the costs of giving the right to B and a
decrease in the costs of implementing the right for A, A. Because of the concavity of the cost function
and the fact that nA > nB, the increase in B will be greater than or equal to the decrease in A. We
write the total change in the costs as . That is:
W
 
= bB   B (4.3)
+ bA + bB   
If the average propensity to pay is the same in both communities, or if it is lower in the B community,
and if  bB does not change, bA + bB  0 and the ex ante cost-benet analysis would provide a too
optimistic criterion for the decision to introduce the right for language B. It would not properly take the
concave cost structure into account.
Only if there are no variable costs in providing the right, and the average propensities to pay in
both communities are the same, the ex ante criterion would be applicable. The increase in nB, which
would change the calculus in favor of introducing the right for language B, would in this case be exactly
balanced by a negative externality on community A. If  bB increases due to the status eect, or if it
originally is bigger than the average in the A community, this result is, of course, relativized and the ex
ante eciency condition could, indeed, be too pessimistic.
In comparison to the static case, the dynamic analysis hence provides arguments for less extensive
language rights due to the concave cost structure in the implementation of the rights.
4.2 Redistribution
There are several distribution eects, both on the benet and the scal side, as well as an income eect
on the A community. The distribution eects on the scal side are connected with the tax system and
its redistributive properties due to the fact that benets and costs are not perfectly correlated. This is
no dierent from other tax-nanced public activities.
4.2.1 Distribution eects between the communities
If the communities are unequal in the eyes of the planner, there is a redistribution eect due to the scal
externality:
  B
1    A
1

AB +  A
1





bB   BA   BB
(4.4)
If the endogenous eect and the dynamic eects are ignored, this reduces to:
  B




12If the B community is underprivileged { if it, for instance, suers discrimination {, this eect is clearly
positive and an argument for more extensive language rights for the B community. Autonomous com-
munities would make the scal externality equal to zero. This would imply earmarked taxes, which is
hardly possible under realistic political constraints on the tax rules, the set 	.
The consideration of the endogeneity of the preferences changes the expression into:
  B
1    A
1

AB +  B
1 bB (4.6)
This provides an added argument for more extensive rights for language B than in the benchmark case.
Taking the dynamic eect into account, we nd:
  B
1    A
1

AB +  A
1





bB   BA   BB
(4.7)
Letting  be the total change in taxes due to the dynamic eect, we have:
 = AA + AB + BA + BB (4.8)
or:   B
1    A
1

AB + AA + AB
+  B
1 bB +  A
1 bA    B
1  (4.9)
Dividing this by  B
1 , we can compare this with the pure eciency eect in 4.3. If the B community
is underprivileged in the eyes of the planner, the rst term will be positive due to the added taxes. The
second term will not change and the third term, which is negative, is smaller in absolute value. Finally
the last term does not change. That is, in comparison to the pure eciency case, we have an argument
for more extensive rights for the B community. The introduction of the right can in part compensate for
the underdog situation of the B community.
However, comparing it to the static case in this section, equation 4.6, the result is not so clear. The rst
term is bigger due to the distributional eects of the tax increase. Also the second and third terms taken
together would add a positive contribution if the average propensities to pay for the right is comparable
in the two communities, or if the increase in the average propensity to pay in the B community is big
enough. These positive eects, however have to be compared to the negative eect of the tax increase
due to the concave cost structure.
4.2.2 Income eect
The income eect is, on the one hand, due to the fact that, in the presence of a scal externality, the
introduction of the right for community B is partially paid by community A, hence reducing the average
income in that community, thereby increasing its average weight,  A, in the welfare function and, on the
other hand, due to the change in the implicit income of the individuals in community B because of the





 B    A
BA (4.10)
We can rewrite this expression as:
 A  
bA   AA
   BBA (4.11)
With a linear approximation of the  functions,  Awill have the sign AB + AA + AB, which
{ even if AA is negative { can safely be assumed to be positive, and   B will have the sign of
bB+bB BB BB BA, which reduces to AB BA+bB BB if the ex ante cost-benet
criterion is marginally satised. Since the second term is non-negative and the third term contains { in
addition to the increase in the B community { an increase in the average propensities to pay (which carries
13no costs), we can safely assume   B to be positive, too. That is, the income eect is an argument for
a more liberal policy in favor of the B community.
The income eect compensates for the unequal treatment of the smaller B community, comparing
an unequal situation without the right and a more equal situation with the right, making the latter
more desirable. When the scal externality vanishes, the whole expression becomes zero unless there is a
dynamic eect, which would make  A positive, since the average tax of an A individual would increase.
This would have the same eect.
Hence, the direct income eect is an argument for more extensive rights for the B community than
what is implied by the ex ante cost-benet analysis.
The indirect eect of the income eect on the distribution is treated below.
4.2.3 Direct distribution eects within the communities
There are distribution eects due to the propensities to pay as well as the taxation. We rst look at the
direct eects caused by the taxation:
   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1 ABV AB
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If taxes are positively correlated with income, all V LM
 are negative, if the planner wants to redistribute
from the poor to the rich. That is, we have both a positive eect on welfare from the introduction of
the right for language B due to the increase in taxes necessitated by the realization of this right, and a
negative eect caused by the dynamic eect, reducing the size of the A community and the taxes paid
for the rights in the A community.










BB + BB + BA
V B

Since the total scal eect is a tax increase, the net eect will be positive if taxes are not earmarked. If
all V's and the  1's are equal,.we nd:
  1









Hence, the distributional scal eect is positive due to the tax increase (as in any public project
leading to a tax increase if taxes are positively correlated with income): This is then an argument for
more extensive rights to the minority language than what is implied by the ex ante cost-benet analysis.
The eect due to the propensities to pay for the language rights is given by:
 A
1 bAV A






The sign of the V L
b 's depends on whether the language right is an inferior or normal good. One can
nd arguments for both assumptions. If the majority language is an elite language not mastered by the
14masses, it is reasonable to assume that the propensities to pay for the rights of the minority language are
decreasing in income and V B
b is positive. If the practical aspect of the right is not to important and it is
more a matter of principle for the speakers of the B language to have the right, it is reasonable to assume
that the propensities to pay increase with income and the V 's are negative. Since bA =  bAnA is
negative and bB + bB is positive, we potentially have two eects of dierent signs, but under any
reasonable assumption the second term will be dominant.
Hence, the eect will be positive if the demand for language rights has a negative income elasticity,
that is, if they are an inferior good, giving us an argument for more extensive rights for the minority. If
the income elasticity is positive, that eect is an argument for less extensive rights.
4.2.4 Distribution eects within the communities due to the income eect
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for i 2 NA, this becomes to a rst approximation:
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and for i 2 NB we nd:
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The correlation of the 's with income is critically dependent of the planer's preferences. In general,
if the planer wants to redistribute to the weak, we would expect that at least for very low and very high
incomes, the derivatives decrease in absolute values with increasing income. The factors in the square
brackets, however, can be expected to increase in the case of an A individual and possibly change sign
for a B individual, if language rights are an inferior good. That is, we can not in general determine if
the 's increase or decrease in income. If language rights are a normal good, the square bracket might
stay positive and vary very little with income. In this case the weights  might be negative for B
individuals. That is, we can expect the V
LM
 's to be smaller in absolute value than the corresponding
V LM
 's or even positive. This could add both a positive as well as a negative term to the welfare and
be an argument for or against more extensive rights for language B than what is implied by the ex ante
cost-benet analysis.
For the eect due to V
A
b , of course, the same applies.
4.3 Conclusions
In the previous analysis, we have seen that there are arguments for more extensive language rights for a
linguistic minority than what comes out of an ex ante cost-benet analysis. But there are also arguments
for an optimal discrimination of the minority.
15Dynamic Fiscal Income Tax Demand
eect externality eect distribution distribution
Minority/majority Fiscal Tax/income Language
 b
B income dierence externality correlation rights
positive zero negative positive positive zero positive negative inferior normal
+/- - + - + 0/+ + - + -
Table 1: Dierent welfare eects of the realization of minority rights in addition to ex ante net benets
For discrimination in this sense speaks the cost structure in a dynamic setting. Generally, due to
concavity, the per capita costs of a certain right increases faster for the minority than for the majority by
an equal change in the size of the group. On the other hand, in a dynamic setting, the possible increase in
the propensities to pay for the right of members of the minority due to the higher status of the minority
language works in the opposite direction.
If the minority community is poorer than the majority, the introduction of the right with its associated
scal externalites on the majority provides arguments for more extensive rights for the minority than
implied by the simple cost-benet analysis.
Finally, distributional scal eects within the communities provide arguments for more rights for the
minority, as does the distributional eect of the propensities to pay if language rights are inferior goods.
The rst eect is the standard result in optimal-taxation analysis with a xed tax revenue; here we have
to compare it with the distribution eects of the benet side, too.
In table 1 these eects are summarized.
5 Concluding remark
In this essay we have tried to examine systematically the factors inuencing the normative arguments for
the allocation of language rights to a linguistic minority from an economic point of view. We have seen
that in a welfare-economics based analysis a simple cost-benet analysis has to be augmented in various
directions.
The scope of the study has been limited to rights in formal domains which can be regulated by legal
means. The larger { and probably more important { issue of how to deal with linguistic discrimination
in the market place, has been totally ignored.
Also the question what constitutes a legitimate minority, is not the topic of this essay. Should
recent immigrants be treated dierently from minorities, whose ancestors have lived in a territory for
numerous generations, often much longer than the majority population? A related question is: When
does a newly arrived group (European immigrants to North America) become the legitimate majority
in a territory and left-over members of the old majority a \normal" minority? This opens up many
interesting, contradictory and important questions, which can be approached and partially resolved by
economic methodology. These are, however, the topics left for future essays.
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